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Abstract 
To understand the extent to which partisan majorities in Congress influence economic 
policy, we compare financial market responses in recent midterm elections to Presidential 
elections. We use prediction markets that track election outcomes as a means of precisely timing 
and calibrating the arrival of news, allowing substantially more precise estimates than a 
traditional event study methodology. We find that equity values, oil prices, and Treasury yields 
are slightly higher with Republican majorities in Congress, and that a switch in the majority party 
in a chamber of Congress has an impact that is only 10-30 percent of that of the Presidency. We 
also find evidence inconsistent with the popular view that divided government is better for 
equities, finding instead that equity valuations increase monotonically, albeit slightly, with the 
degree of Republican control. 
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How important is the majority party in Congress in shaping the broad contours of 
economic policy?  Different theories of legislative policymaking yield strikingly different 
predictions.  In cartel theories of party power (Cox and McCubbins 2002, 2005), the majority 
party leadership controls the agenda, and uses their power to move policy towards the 
preferences of the median member of the majority party.  The median Democrat and the median 
Republican are likely to have sharply different preferences, so switches in the majority party may 
have large effects on expected economic policies.  In contrast, if the party label chosen by a 
legislator is only a rough description of preferences in a policy space (as in Krehbiel 1993) the 
median legislator determines policy.  Elections that change the majority party rarely move the 
preferences of the median representative by much, so elections are unlikely to have much effect 
on expectations about economic policy.1 
 Using the approach developed in Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007), we precisely 
estimate financial market responses to changes in the majority party in Congress. Specifically, 
we analyze the response of equity, currency, oil and bond prices to sharp changes in the 
probability that each party would gain a Congressional majority in the 2006 midterm elections.  
We measure these political shocks using high-frequency prediction market data, and focus on the 
period when the vote count was underway (and hence after votes were cast), thereby isolating a 
period in which the link between political and economic expectations reflects only the influence 
of changing electoral expectations on expectations about economic policy.2 Comparing these 
new estimates of the effects of changes in Congressional majorities to our earlier estimates of the 
effects of a switch in the party of the President, we find that changes in the majority party in 
Congress yield substantially smaller effects. We also find evidence inconsistent with the popular 
conception that markets prefer the President and a majority of Congress to be from different 
parties.3 Because this notion is premised on divided control resulting in lower legislative 
productivity, our result is consistent with the findings in Mayhew (1991). 
                                                
1 It is possible to construct examples where the floor median moves more than the median of the majority party 
when party control switches, but such an example requires extremely high levels of legislator turnover—much 
higher than the level observed in Congress. 
2 For an in-depth discussion of our methodology see Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007), particularly the 
discussion of the importance of using instrumental events such as elections to infer causation. 
3 John Tierney (New York Times, 11/14/06) provided a particularly clear articulation of this view, claiming “The 
prospect of gridlock has been welcomed, as usual, on Wall Street.”  Tierney went on to equate divided party control 
with gridlock, a view that may be construed as an extreme form of the cartel theory of parties.  Research by Alesina 
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 Two notes of caution are in order. First, we are measuring investors’ expectations of 
political outcomes on asset values; investors may of course be pleasantly or unpleasantly 
surprised by the winning party’s actual policies once in office.  Second, although our finding that 
elections affect financial markets implies that they should also affect economic policies and 
welfare, we caution that we can only speak to the effects of the elections we analyze. Further, the 
effect of a candidate on a variable such as equity prices may differ from their effect on economic 
welfare.  
 
The 2006 Election 
In the run-up to the 2006 Congressional elections, Tradesports.com created two contracts 
tied to Republican majorities in Congress: one paid $10 if Republicans maintained a majority in 
the Senate, the other $10 if they maintained a majority in the House.  As illustrated in Figure 1, 
the House contract traded at $2 at the beginning of election night, suggesting that Republicans 
had a 20% chance of maintaining their majority in the House.4 At 5 p.m. EST exit poll data 
indicating a poor showing by Republicans became available. As actual vote tallies provided 
confirmatory evidence of a Republican loss, this probability slowly declined to zero.  In contrast, 
the probability of Republicans retaining a majority of Senate seats began election night at 
approximately 70% and fluctuated substantially. The release of early vote counts in Virginia and 
Missouri, which put Republican Senators Allen and Talent in the lead, caused this probability to 
rise to 90%. A few hours later, as both Allen and Talent fell behind, the probability of 
Republicans maintaining a majority plummeted. 
 In order to quantify the economic effects of partisan majorities in Congress, we pair 
prediction market data from Tradesports.com with the price of the last transaction in the same 
30-minute period for the December 2006 futures contract of various financial variables.5 We then 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Rosenthal (1995), and Chari, Jones and Marimon (1997) suggests that divided control leads to policy 
moderation. 
4 Given the small covariance between the political contracts we analyze and aggregate financial asset values, if 
traders share a common belief about probability, any difference between it and prices due to hedging is extremely 
small.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that even when beliefs about probabilities differ, for realistic 
assumptions about the risk aversion of traders, prediction market prices can be interpreted as a measure of the 
central tendency of beliefs about the probability of an event.   
5 Specifically, we analyze the near-month Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) S&P 500, Nasdaq 100, Euro, Yen, 
and Canadian Dollar futures, and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and 
2 and 10 year Treasury Note futures.  We analyze futures rather than the actual indices because only the futures are 
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regress the changes in financial variables on the change in the price of the contracts tracking the 
Republican’s chances of maintaining majorities in both houses of Congress:6 
 
ΔLog(Financial variablet) = α + β ΔPr(R majority in Senate)t + γ ΔPr(R majority in House)t + εt        (1) 
 
 The coefficients reported in Table 1 can be interpreted as the change in each financial 
variable associated with a change of Congress from majority Democrat to majority Republican. 
Panel A shows the results from the 2006 midterm elections. The estimated effect of a change in 
the majority party in the Senate on the S&P 500, 0.17%, while statistically significant, is an 
order of magnitude smaller than the effect of a change in the party of the President in the 2004 
election (Panel C). The effect of partisan majorities in the Senate on other financial variables is 
precisely estimated, and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The relative importance of 
Congress and the President to equity prices is reinforced by the fact that the largest event in our 
financial data is a 0.6% rally in the S&P 500 (and other equity indices) following the 1 p.m. EST 
resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Figure 1).7 
 In contrast to our Senate results, the effects of partisan majorities in the House are 
imprecisely estimated because the election outcome—a Democratic majority—was widely 
expected, yielding little election-night variation. Even so, these estimates, while statistically 
indistinguishable from either zero or the corresponding Senate estimates, are clearly smaller than 
the effects of a change in the party of the President. 
 We can be much more precise about the effects of the Senate majority due to the large 
shifts in election probabilities during a time of night that was free of other news. The bottom 
panel of Figure 1 illustrates the close link between the stock market and the Republican’s 
fluctuating electoral fortunes between 9 p.m. EST on election day and 2 a.m. the day after.  
During this period, the probability of a Republican majority in the Senate first rose from 60% to 
90% and then plummeted to 10%, and the value of the S&P 500 moved in lockstep with the 
                                                                                                                                                       
actively traded in the period after regular trading hours.  The need to analyze data after the main U.S. markets closed 
constrains the set of financial variables we can analyze. 
6 In order to control for heteroskedasticity introduced by missing observations, we implement weighted least 
squares, and use White (1980) standard errors. A Scholes-Williams (1977) specification, which corrects for potential 
bias due to asynchronous trading, produced similar results. Using 60-minute first-differences produced similar 
coefficients, but larger standard errors.  Estimating (1) for the House or Senate separately does not alter the results. 
Finally, adding contracts that control for the expected number of seats in each house does not affect the results. 
7 The price of a related Tradesports contract just prior to Rumsfeld’s resignation suggests that markets had already 
priced in a 40% chance of him resigning before the end of 2006. 
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Tradesports contract. This high correlation drives the precision of our estimates, while the 
relatively small size of the equity price movements through this period explains the small 
estimated effect. This example also illustrates an advantage of using prediction markets in event 
studies—they allow us to isolate periods in which political news is the dominant force financial 
markets.8 
 Over this period the likelihood of a Republican majority in the Senate was largely 
determined by the probability of Republican wins in Virginia and Missouri. Thus, the associated 
decline in equity prices may be due either to the small change in the preferences of the median 
Senator, or the change in the majority party, or both. To the extent that the decline was 
associated with a change in the majority party, the presence of an equity response is consistent 
with cartel theory, although the data do not inform us about the validity of the central mechanism 
of that theory. 
 If party nominees for President and Congressional leadership are both elected by the 
respective medians of their parties, then our corresponding estimates from the 2004 Presidential 
election provide a rough basis for comparison of the relative power of parties in the two branches 
of government. The relatively small size of the Congressional party effect indicates that 
Congressional majorities have little control over economic policy. 
 
Previous Elections 
We now turn to analyzing related information from prior mid-term elections.9 The 
2002 election is the only other midterm election where we have access to high frequency data 
from a liquid prediction market. Our Tradesports data suggest that on election night 2002, 
Republicans had a 90% chance of maintaining their majority in the House and a 40% chance of 
gaining a majority in the Senate.10 Over the course of election night these election probabilities 
increased as Republicans won a majority of both chambers (Figure 2). Unfortunately for our 
purposes, the outcome for the House was so close to expectations that there is no useful election-
night variation in this contract to analyze. The Tradesports market for the House was also 
                                                
8 Estimating Equation 1 using only the 9 p.m.-2 a.m. period produces almost identical estimates as the longer-
window regressions in Figure 1, but with smaller standard errors. 
9 The effects of the Presidency are so large as to dominate election-night news, hampering our attempts at learning 
more about Congressional effects from anything other than midterm elections. 
10 Senator Jeffords’ defection to the Democrats in 2001 had robbed the Republicans of their earlier majority. 
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extremely thinly traded. Thus, Table 1 presents a formal analysis of the 2002 election, but 
focuses only on the Senate race.11 Fortunately there is sufficient variation to allow us to make 
useful, albeit somewhat imprecise estimates of the effects of winning a Senate majority. Once 
again there is statistically significant evidence that the identity of the majority party affects 
financial markets. The estimated effects are again significantly smaller than the effects of the 
party of the President, albeit slightly larger than the effect of Senate control in 2006.  
 The 1998 midterm election was—unfortunately for our purposes—largely a foregone 
conclusion, with the Iowa Electronic Markets correctly projecting the continuing Republican 
majorities with a 90% probability.12 
The 1994 midterms provided some big surprises, and hence some useful experiments.  
On the night before the 1994 election, data from the Iowa Electronic Market suggested that 
Republicans had a 70% chance of gaining a majority in the Senate, and only a 20% chance of 
taking the House. A search of newswire reports from election night 1994 reveals that there was 
little information about outcomes released before 4 p.m. EST, and that both chambers were 
called for the Republicans by 11 p.m. EST. Over this seven hour event window the S&P 500 
steadily rose (Figure 3), yielding a total gain of 0.395% (standard error = 0.288%); oil prices rose 
$0.26 ($0.066), the price of the Yen rose 0.174% (.179%), the price of the German Mark (the 
major European currency before the Euro) rose 0.196% (.169%) and the 10 year Treasury note 
yield was unchanged.13 While some of these shifts are statistically significant, scaling these shifts 
by the corresponding electoral surprise (combining both the effects of a largely surprising 
Republican House victory and an expected Senate victory), leads to the conclusion that the 
majority party in Congress has smaller effects on these financial prices than the party in the 
White House.14 
 Finally, Jayachandran (2006) examined a related experiment: the May 2001 defection of 
Vermont Senator James Jeffords from the Republicans, which switched the majority party in the 
                                                
11 Including data from the House race as a control does not change our estimates. 
12 The Iowa Electronic markets ran contracts on Congressional majorities in both 1998 and 1994, but we have access 
only to the daily closing prices, rather than high-frequency price data we used in 2002 and 2006. 
13 Standard errors (in parentheses) are the standard deviation of changes in these variables over 4-11 p.m. EST for 50 
weekdays before and 50 weekdays after the election. This yields a standard error identical to what one would obtain 
from a traditional event study approach of regressing daily 4-11 PM EST returns on an election night dummy.  
Overnight trading activity in the Canadian Dollar and 2 year Treasury note was almost non-existent in 1994. 
14 Given the stronger historical incumbency advantage for Congress than for the Presidency, one might expect a 
Congressional election outcome like 1994 to have longer lasting implications for partisan control than a Presidential 
election outcome, and thus our comparison may overstate the relative near-term impact of Congress. 
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Senate from the Republican to Democrat. While Jayachandran’s approach differs from ours, her 
calculations yield roughly consistent magnitudes: she estimates that this unexpected switch in 
partisan majorities in the Senate resulted in a decrease in the equity value of the average 
company that donated to Republicans of 0.4% and an increase in the value of the average 
company that donated to Democrats of 0.1%. 
 
Discussion 
 In order for partisan majorities in Congress to have an effect on economic outcomes, the 
parties must both have different preferences over economic policy, and the ability to implement 
their preferred policy once in the majority. The evidence in Snowberg, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2007) establishes that financial prices respond strongly to whether the President is a 
Democrat or a Republican, suggesting that the parties do indeed have different preferences over 
economic outcomes. 
Yet while we document evidence that equity prices and bond yields rose in response to 
news of Republican majorities in the House and Senate (1994, 2002), and fell in response to the 
Democratic majorities established in 2006, these effects were uniformly small, and substantially 
smaller than responses to news about changes in the party of the President. Thus we conclude 
that the majority party in Congress has relatively little control over economic policy, at least as it 
affects equity, bond, oil and currency prices. This may be because parties in Congress have little 
power over how their members vote on economic policy, or because Congress is weaker than the 
President in determining economic policy. This is not to deny an important role for Congress, but 
simply to note little evidence of influence on economic aggregates. It is worth considering this 
result jointly with Jayachandran’s (2006) evidence that parties in Congress may have important 
distributional effects, shuffling benefits between constituent groups. 
 Finally, our data can speak to the popular perception that markets prefer divided 
government to unified control by either party. For instance, the equity market fell in response to 
Democrats winning a House majority in 2006, although this election also created divided 
government. Similarly, in 2002, the equity market rose in response to the Democrats’ losing their 
Senate majority, which eliminated divided government. This suggests that the response of 
markets to the Republican victory in 1994 more likely reflects a preference for Republican 
control than divided government. All told, any value markets place on divided versus unified 
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government must be very small in comparison with the already inconsequential amount they 
prefer Republican to Democratic majorities in Congress. 
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Tables – 1 
Table 1 
Dependent Variable:            ΔLog(Price)*100  ΔPrice ($) ΔYield (bp) 
 S&P 500 Nasdaq 100 
Japanese 
Yen Euro 
Canadian 
Dollar Oil 
2 Year 
T-Note 
10 Year 
T-Note 
 Panel A: Congressional Elections, 2006 
ΔPr(Senate) 0.174 
(.089) 
0.156 
(.101) 
0.025 
(.044) 
0.087 
(.061) 
0.022 
(.045) 
0.034 
(.079) 
0.918 
(1.15) 
0.701 
(.693) 
ΔPr(House) 0.537 
(.729) 
-0.017 
(1.11) 
0.016 
(.706) 
-0.450 
(.635) 
0.552 
(.687) 
-0.209 
(.893) 
-0.131 
(6.54) 
-2.11 
(6.09) 
n 30 29 28 28 28 30 26 27 
 
 Panel B: Congressional Elections, 2002 
ΔPr(Senate) 0.593 
(.231) 
0.728 
(.419) 
-0.196 
(0.187) 
0.011 
(.127) 
0.071 
(.068) 
0.148 
(0.060) 
4.51 
(1.81) 
2.21 
(1.02) 
n 13 12 13 13 12 14 7 7 
 
 Panel C: Presidential Elections, 2004 
ΔPr(President) 2.05 
(.503) 
2.40 
(.814) 
-0.531 
(.296) 
-0.694 
(.358) 
-0.488 
(.221) 
1.706 
(.659) 
10.8 
(3.58) 
12.0 
(4.65) 
n 35 35 34 34 34 29 30 31 
 
Notes: White (1980) standard errors in parentheses. The sample period for 2006 is 4 p.m. Eastern Time on 11/7/2006 to 9 a.m. on 
11/8/2006, for 2002 it is 4 p.m. on 11/5/2002 to midnight on 11/6/2002.  Election probabilities are the most recent transaction prices 
collected every thirty minutes from Tradesports.com. When there are missing observation, and the bid and ask prices are within 10 
percentage points of each other, we use the bid-ask average. Currency, S&P and Nasdaq futures are from the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange; Dow and bond futures are from the Chicago Board of Trade. All futures have delivery dates of December 2006, December 
2004 and December 2002, respectively. Yields are calculated for the Treasury futures using the daily yields reported by the Federal 
Reserve for 2 and 10-year Treasuries and projecting forward from the bond market close at 3 pm using future price changes and the 
future’s durations of 1.96 and 7.97 reported by CBOT. Presidential data is from Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007).
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